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Academic studies usually present the points of view of their authors. In the specific 
field of deliberation in constitutional and supreme courts, although the dynamic, 
quality and results of the deliberations are analysed from various points of view, that 
perspective almost always comes from outside the court. What judges think of their 
deliberative performance or what they think of the deliberative model in the court to 
which they belong is rarely known. This article aims to address this issue by presenting 
the thoughts of justices on a certain supreme court regarding the deliberations in which 
they participate. Its goal is thus not to formulate general hypotheses about deliberation 
in constitutional and supreme courts or even specific hypotheses about a particular 
court. It presents some of the results of a broad study on the deliberative practices of the 
Brazilian Supreme Court. This research was based on interviews with the justices of 
the Court as well as other sources. These interviews sought to understand what the 
Supreme Court justices think—or at least what they say they think—about the 
deliberative process in which they participate, especially their views on how the 
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deliberation and judgement sessions are organized, as well as on the value of consensus 
and collegiality. 
Keywords: supreme courts, constitutional courts, deliberation, judicial 
behavior, judicial review 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 210 
II. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................... 213 
III. THE VALUE OF DELIBERATION AND COLLEGIALITY ............................... 216 
IV. THE JUDGEMENT SESSION AS A DELIBERATION SESSION ......................... 218 
1. Order of the Reading of the Opinions ..................................................................... 221 
2. The Order of Reading and the Weight of the Justices .......................................... 223 
3. How to Act When the Case Is Mathematically Resolved? .................................. 226 
4. Interaction with Lawyers ..................................................................................... 229 
V. CONSENSUS SEEKING ................................................................................... 231 
VI. COLLEGIALITY ............................................................................................. 235 
1. Is There Collegiality on the Brazilian Supreme Court?......................................... 235 
2. Collegiality and Opening to the Arguments of Others .......................................... 238 
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 239 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Academic studies generally present the perspectives of their authors 
regarding a given subject. In the specific field of deliberation in constitutional 
and supreme courts, although the dynamic, quality and results of the 
deliberations are analysed from various points of view, that perspective 
almost always comes from outside the court. Thus, it is interesting to explore 
judges' opinions of their deliberative performance or the deliberative model 
of the court to which they belong, as these opinions are seldom publicly 
known or taken into account.1 
                                                 
1 Of course, this does not mean that judges' perspectives are never taken into 
consideration in academic studies. There are enough studies, especially on judicial 
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This article aims to address this issue by presenting the thoughts of justices 
on a certain supreme court regarding the deliberations in which they 
participate. Therefore, it is not a study that defends a certain deliberative 
model nor is its goal to formulate general hypotheses about deliberation in 
constitutional and supreme courts or even specific hypotheses about a 
particular court. In a certain manner, this article aims to contrast some of the 
assumptions and hypotheses I formulated elsewhere about judicial 
deliberation in general, and about the deliberative practices of the Brazilian 
Supreme Court in particular, with the opinions of the judges of this court.2 In 
that article, I pointed out countless deliberative shortcomings in the 
Brazilian Supreme Court and concluded that in fact, there is no deliberation 
among the judges on this court. 
As will be shown throughout this text, in general, the Supreme Court judges 
disagree with this assessment. It is possible to argue that in fact, they are 
satisfied with the deliberative model adopted in this Court. This article 
presents some of the results of a broad study on the deliberative practices of 
the Brazilian Supreme Court. This research was based on interviews with the 
justices of the Court as well as other sources. Contrary to the objectives of 
similar studies conducted regarding other courts,3 the main goal of these 
interviews was not to reveal what takes place in the deliberation and 
judgement room because Brazilian Supreme Court sessions are public and 
their plenary sessions are broadcast live on television. Instead, the interviews 
sought to understand what the Supreme Court justices think — or at least 
                                                 
behaviour, that include interviews with judges as part of their dataset. However, they 
rarely involve interviews with supreme court or constitutional court judges and even 
more rarely within the specific field of judicial deliberation in such courts. 
2 Virgílio Afonso da Silva, 'Deciding Without Deliberating' (2013) 11 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 557. 
3 For example, the main objective of the interviews conducted by Kranenpohl with the 
justices of the German Constitutional Court was to better understand the dynamics 
of the deliberation sessions of this court, which are completely secret. See Uwe 
Kranenpohl, Hinter dem Schleier des Beratungsgeheimnisses (VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften 2010).  
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what they say they think4 — about the deliberative process in which they 
participate.  
To achieve this objective, this article is divided into five main sections. The 
first section presents the general objectives and methodology of the 
research.5 Section two briefly presents the core concept underlying the 
interviews: deliberation. The third section systematizes the justices' general 
opinions concerning the organization of the Brazilian Supreme Court's 
deliberation and judgement sessions. In this section, my more general 
hypothesis stating that the judgement session is not a deliberation session6 is 
questioned. Section four focuses on the value of consensus in the deliberative 
process. Finally, the fifth section presents the justices' thoughts on the 
importance of collegiality in the deliberative process and their opinions 
about its existence in the Brazilian Supreme Court. In the conclusion, in 
addition to systematizing the results of the case study, I also present an 
exercise called 'institutional creativity'. Conducted at the end of each of the 
interviews: each justice was asked to define what, in his opinion,7 would be 
the best deliberative model for the Supreme Court. To a certain extent, this 
institutional creativity exercise encapsulates the view that justices have of 
                                                 
4 It is certainly impossible to identify whether justices are offering their honest 
opinions or the answers that they deem most compatible with their position or public 
image. This article should be read with this limitation in mind. However, this is not a 
shortcoming; instead, it is part of a methodological option. The goal of this article is 
not to investigate, for example, whether there is actually a consensus-seeking 
tendency in the Court or how often justices change their opinions. In fact, to achieve 
these goals, quantitative research would have been the best method. However, if the 
goal is to uncover how the justices see themselves as deliberators, the best way to 
accomplish this is to interview them, even if there is a risk of insincere answers. To 
minimize that chance, the confidentiality of the answers was emphasized before each 
interview. For more details, see section I (Methodology). 
5 The text in the first section, which summarizes the methodology and goals of the 
research on the deliberations of the Brazilian Supreme Court, is repeated in all the 
articles that present the results of this research. 
6 See da Silva (n 2) 570. 
7 The use of the pronouns 'he', 'his', and 'him' does not imply a gender-based option for 
the masculine over the feminine in this article. It simply results from the fact that 
none of the women who are or were justices in the Brazilian Supreme Court chose to 
participate in this research (see note 13). 
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their roles as deliberators within a collegial body such as the Brazilian 
Supreme Court. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
Since the deliberation and decision-making process adopted by the Brazilian 
Supreme Court has been the same for many decades, each new justice must 
follow the practices dictated by tradition and the Court's rules of procedure. 
However, that does not mean that all justices share the same view of their role 
on the Supreme Court as a collective institution. In other words, despite the 
fact that an increasing amount of information is accessible — from online 
databases, through TV Justiça (a TV channel operated by the judiciary that, 
among other things, broadcasts the plenary sessions of the Brazilian Supreme 
Court live), on YouTube or even on Twitter — we still cannot assess the role 
that the justices themselves want to play or what they think of the current 
decision-making process of the Court. It would not be sound to assume that 
all justices share the same views on the value of collegiality or dissenting 
opinions, the role of the justice rapporteur, or the effects of the extreme 
publicity surrounding the Court's deliberation and decision-making process. 
The interviews were intended to provide this input to better understand the 
Brazilian Supreme Court's deliberation practices from material hitherto 
unavailable.8 
Between September 2011 and August 2013, seventeen justices (incumbent and 
retired) were interviewed. The interviews were structured (i.e., the same for 
all justices) and consisted of 36 questions, some with sub-questions, on the 
following subjects: the role of the justice rapporteur, concurrent and 
dissenting opinions, deliberation dynamics, deliberation and the legitimacy 
of judicial review, agenda setting and deliberation, methods of constitutional 
interpretation, the value of consensus, interruptions during the deliberation 
process,9 collegiality, publicity and TV broadcasting, deliberation and 
                                                 
8 After this research was concluded, the Getulio Vargas Foundation Law School in Rio 
de Janeiro began a project called 'História Oral do Supremo Tribunal Federal' (Oral 
History of the Brazilian Supreme Court), which has interviewed several justices of the 
Brazilian Supreme Court. Although thematically wider in scope, these interviews also 
contain questions related to the deliberative process in the Court. 
9 See note 47 below. 
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binding precedents, and deliberation and public opinion. Each interview 
lasted an average of 1 hour and 15 minutes. The longest interview took 2 hours 
and 45 minutes and the shortest, 45 minutes. The questions had not been 
revealed in advance and all interviews were conducted face-to-face. Each 
interview was recorded and subsequently transcribed. 
To ensure confidentiality, the names of the justices were replaced by letters. 
Although there is no recognizable order to these letters, a clear division was 
made: letters A through I represent the justices who were incumbent at the 
time of the interview, and letters N through U represent those who were 
already retired at the time of the interview. In the text, I do not distinguish 
between incumbent justices and retired justices, except in those cases in 
which this distinction would be helpful to clarify contrasts between their 
views. 
Despite their busy schedules, the justices were generally welcoming to the 
goals of the research. In many cases, they were willing to schedule more than 
one appointment to ensure that the interviews would be conducted at the 
ideal pace. Since only a few justices refused to be interviewed, it can be 
assumed that the results have a robust explanatory power regarding the 
deliberative practices of the Brazilian Supreme Court.10 
This article — as well as others presenting the results of my research — does 
not have the typical structure of a law journal article.11 As stated above, it does 
                                                 
10 Only four incumbent justices refused to be interviewed despite many attempts to 
gain their interest: Celso de Mello, Joaquim Barbosa, Cármen Lúcia Antunes Rocha 
and Rosa Weber. Since these two latter justices refused to talk and retired Justice 
Ellen Gracie Northfleet never answered several invitations sent to her, unfortunately, 
no women were interviewed for this research. 
11 Even articles that include interviews do not usually have the structure of this article. 
Again, Kranenpohl's research is an exception. In addition to the above mentioned 
book (Kranenpohl, Hinter dem Schleier des Beratungsgeheimnisses (n 3)), see also Uwe 
Kranenpohl, 'Herr des Verfahrens oder nur Einer unter Acht? Der Einfluss des 
Berichterstatters in der Rechtsprechungspraxis des Bundesverfassungsgerichts' 
(2009) 30 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 135; Uwe Kranenpohl, 'Die 
gesellschaftlichen Legitimationsgrundlagen der Verfassungsrechtsprechung oder: 
Darum lieben die Deutschen Karlsruhe' (2009) 56 Zeitschrift für Politik 436; and 
Uwe Kranenpohl, 'Die Bedeutung von Interpretationsmethoden und Dogmatik in 
der Entscheidungspraxis des Bundesverfassungsgerichts' (2009) 48 Der Staat 387.  
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not aim to defend a thesis on the Brazilian Supreme Court's deliberative 
process or to describe this process from a purely external perspective, much 
less to offer a comprehensive review of literature on the matter at hand. The 
goal is to deliver something that could be called an internal description. Just as 
the Supreme Court's decisions are the result of 11 different individual 
opinions that somehow have to fit into a final document, this internal 
description of the Supreme Court's deliberative practices also tries to 
compose a picture of that institutional practice from myriad individual 
points of view of its members. The only difference is that in this research, it 
is 17 justices that comprise this picture rather than 11.12 
However, it is important to stress that although this article focuses mainly on 
presenting the opinions of the Brazilian Supreme Court justices on issues 
related to the deliberative practices of this Court, it is not merely a collage of 
points of view. On the one hand, because those points of view have been 
sorted out and systematized; on the other hand, because although I do not 
intend to take sides on the issues addressed, it was occasionally necessary to 
note some contradictions in the justices' statements or highlight some factual 
inconsistencies related to them. 
A final clarification concerning the goals of the research and interviews is that 
their main topic was not the justices' attitudes on the tens of thousands of 
decisions made every year by the Court. Special focus was placed on the most 
important, politically and morally controversial decisions because many 
statements about, for example, the role of the justice rapporteur, the number 
of dissenting and concurring opinions, or the dynamics of the deliberation 
process only apply to those controversial cases.13 
                                                 
12 The following incumbent (at the time of the interview) and retired justices were 
interviewed. Incumbents: Ayres Britto, Cézar Peluso, Dias Toffoli, Enrique 
Lewandowski, Gilmar Mendes, Luiz Fux, Marco Aurélio Mello, Luís Roberto 
Barroso and Teori Zavascki. Retired: Carlos Velloso, Eros Grau, Francisco Rezek, 
Ilmar Galvão, Moreira Alves, Nelson Jobim, Sepúlveda Pertence and Sydney 
Sanches. 
13 An example related to the role of the justice rapporteur may illustrate the importance 
of this clarification. While it is true that in the vast majority of decisions, the justices 
tend to vote along with the justice rapporteur without further inquiry, this is not the 
case in those more politically and morally controversial decisions, which are also the 
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In other words, a strictly quantitative study might show a different scenario 
than that which served as the backdrop for my research. However, I think 
that the choice to focus on a rather small set of decisions is justified. If one 
seeks to analyse the Brazilian Supreme Court as a constitutional court, then 
it does not make sense to take into account the deliberations of the justices 
when deciding the tens of thousands of interlocutory appeals they decide 
every year. What really matters here is the justices' attitudes in their 
decisions on those politically and morally charged cases that constitutional 
courts typically decide, such as those involving political reform, campaign 
financing, abortion, stem cell research, same-sex marriage, affirmative action, 
drugs, and so forth.14 
III. THE VALUE OF DELIBERATION AND COLLEGIALITY 
The interviews took at least one assumption for granted: the better the 
deliberative performance of a court exercising judicial review, the better the 
court itself is. The positive value of deliberation as such was therefore not in 
question. The theoretical framework that underpins this assumption has 
already been developed elsewhere and need not be fully analysed here.15 
                                                 
decisions that draw greater public attention outside the Court. The same applies to 
the practice of bringing lengthy written opinions to the plenary sessions and reading 
them; this usually happens only in those major decisions.  
14 The definition of a controversial case is far from clear-cut. For example, it is not 
possible to state that all plenary decisions (as opposed to panel decisions) or all non-
unanimous decisions are controversial. There are both panel decisions and 
unanimous decisions that may be considered controversial. Maybe the best example 
of the latter is the decision on same-sex civil unions, from 2011 (ADI 4277). Although 
it was a unanimous decision, its subject-matter is quite controversial. This is the 
reason why, instead of trying to provide a clear concept of a controversial decision, I 
decided to deliver many examples of recent decisions that should be, at least for the 
goals of this research, considered controversial. Not coincidentally, the unanimous 
decisions used as examples often have many concurring opinions. 
15 For more details on these theoretical discussions, see da Silva (n 2). For other defences 
of judicial review grounded in the deliberative attributes of supreme or constitutional 
courts, see, for instance, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press 
1993) 231; Conrado Hübner Mendes, Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy 
(Oxford University Press 2013); Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading 
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It may nevertheless be summed up as follows. Justices in supreme and 
constitutional courts are not directly elected. Therefore, the legitimacy of 
these courts in reviewing the legislation passed by democratically elected 
parliaments must have different foundations. The most frequently 
mentioned source of their legitimacy is surely the fact that they can protect 
the constitutional rights of minorities. However, there are other sources, and 
the quality of the deliberation is one of them. When courts do not deliberate 
(or when they deliberate poorly), they add nothing (or very little) to the work 
already done by the legislature. In other words, if court decisions consist of 
pure head counting, then Waldron is right to challenge their legitimacy.16 
Thus, the assumption that courts are (or at least can be) institutions with a 
distinct deliberative potential is paramount to their legitimacy.  
The assumption that deliberation is a central feature in the decision-making 
process of a supreme or constitutional court defined the organization of the 
interviews. The concept of deliberation underlying the questions is that of 
internal deliberation: 'the effort to use persuasion and reasoning to get the 
group to decide on some common course of action', which involves 'giving 
and listening to reasons from others inside the group'.17 Most questions were 
related to what I consider the 'conditions under which the full deliberative 
potential of an institution can be attained'.18 The most important of these is 
collegiality. The value of collegiality, however, was not taken for granted, at 
least not to the degree that the value of deliberation was. The justices could 
deny — and some of them indeed did — the positive value of collegiality. The 
concept of collegiality underlying the interviews implied qualities such as the 
disposition to work as a team, the willingness to listen to arguments advanced 
                                                 
of the American Constitution (Oxford University Press 1996) 1–38; Christopher L 
Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Harvard University Press 2001). 
16 See Jeremy Waldron, 'The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review' (2006) 115 Yale 
Law Journal 1346, 1391. 
17 John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, 'Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from 
Europe' (2004) 82 Texas Law Review 1671, 1692. In opposition to the concept of 
internal deliberation, Ferejohn and Pasquino define external deliberation as 'the 
effort to use persuasion and reasoning to affect actions taken outside the group', 
which involves 'the group, or its members, giving and listening to reasons coming 
from outside the group'. 
18 da Silva (n 2) 562–67. 
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by other justices (i.e., being open to being convinced by their good 
arguments), cooperativeness in the decision-making process, and mutual 
respect among judges.19 An entire section is also dedicated to a final feature 
of my concept of collegiality, namely, 'the disposition to speak, whenever 
possible, not as a sum of individuals but as an institution (consensus-seeking 
deliberation)'.20  
IV. THE JUDGEMENT SESSION AS A DELIBERATION SESSION 
In the discussion regarding whether there is truly deliberation on the 
Brazilian Supreme Court, a preliminary question was whether the judgement 
session should be characterized as a deliberation session. This question 
addresses the more general thesis I advanced elsewhere, according to which 
the judgement session is not a deliberation session.21 The question posed to 
the justices was rather straightforward: 'Do you think that a judgement 
session in the Brazilian Supreme Court is also a deliberation session?' The 
concept of deliberation underlying the entire interview was expressed at the 
outset: 'During this interview, deliberation should be understood in its 
widest sense, as the exchange of arguments within a collegial institution with 
the goal of persuasion and decision making'.  
Although the opinions of the justices have seldom been unanimous, those 
who said that the judgement session is not a deliberation session frequently 
clarified that this was the case only because of the workload and not 
necessarily due to the way the session was organized.22 More than a few 
justices mentioned Article 135 of the Court's rules of procedure, which 
defines the voting order in the Supreme Court. This article suggests that 
before presenting the position of each justice, there will be an oral debate: 
                                                 
19 ibid 562–63. 
20 ibid 563. 
21 See ibid 570: 'the plenary session means 'opinion-reading session' rather than 
'deliberation session'.' 
22 Similarly, see Mathilde Cohen, 'Ex Ante versus Ex Post Deliberations: Two Models 
of Judicial Deliberations in Courts of Last Resort' (2014) 62 Am J Comp L 951, 999: 
'the deliberative ideal lacks verisimilitude for certain courts by virtue of their 
skyrocketing dockets.' 
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Art. 135. Once the oral debate is finished, the Chief Justice will hear the reading 
of the written opinion of the rapporteur [...] and of the other justices, in 
reverse order of seniority.23  
This oral debate is regulated by Article 133 of the Court's rules of procedure:  
Art. 133. Each justice may speak twice about the issue under discussion; he or 
she may also speak one additional time, if necessary, to explain a 
modification in his or her opinion. No one will speak without authorization 
from the Chief Justice, and no one will interrupt the justice who is speaking 
without asking him or her to briefly cede the floor and receiving that 
permission. 
Clearly, these are not the characteristics of an open debate. Of course, in 
practice, on the few occasions during which there is an exchange of 
arguments before each justice's opinion is presented, this rigidity in the 
Court's rules of procedure is usually not followed. However, in the most 
important cases before the Brazilian Supreme Court, the practice has been to 
move directly to the reading of the written opinion of each justice without 
the preliminary oral debate mentioned in Article 133. Nevertheless, several 
justices still consider the judgement session to be a deliberation session as 
well. This appears so clear to some justices that they do not even bother to 
provide much justification.24 
Others justify this understanding through more arguments, as did Justice B: 
I have the impression that it is a deliberation session. I think that a decision 
can be constructed that may not have even been in the written opinion of the 
justice rapporteur. 
This outcome, mentioned by Justice B, corresponds substantially to one of 
the objectives that Fearon attributed to deliberation, which is the 
construction of a result that may not have been the initial idea of any 
participant in the debate.25 Similarly, other justices also appear to believe that 
it is a deliberation session because although the opinions may be written 
                                                 
23 Emphasis added. Art. 134, § 2 of the Court's rules of procedure also mentions oral 
debates. 
24 For example, Justice I ('I think so, it certainly is'), Justice Q ('I think so, I think so') 
and Justice O ('There is, there is [deliberation]'). 
25 See James D Fearon, 'Deliberation as Discussion' in Jon Elster (ed), Deliberative 
Democracy (Cambridge University Press 1998) 44.  
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before the session begins, there is an opportunity for change and adaptation, 
particularly when such change is possibly based on comments from other 
justices: 
Yes [it is a deliberation session], because you start your reasoning from the 
beginning, you explain its path, and in the course of this presentation, you 
may be interrupted by a colleague who tries to establish different premises. I 
think that this is true deliberation despite the fact that you had your ideas 
previously organized in a written format.26 It is a deliberation session in 
terms of the conclusion of the process. We meet together to discuss and 
exchange ideas, and we mutually complement each other [to] reach what we 
understand to be the best solution for each distinct case.27 
Even those who understand that the model does not encourage debate may 
argue that the judgement session is also a deliberation session: 
I believe [that it is a deliberation session] in the sense of an exchange of ideas 
and an eventual readjustment of positions. Certainly yes, although the model 
does not particularly favour this.28 
In a similar sense, but with a bit more of a critical tone, Justice H argued:  
It is a mixture of voting and debate. You are debating, and at the same time, 
you are also voting. This hampers deepening the discussion because if you 
could do it as the Court's rules of procedure dictate and simply participate in 
a debate, you [would think] 'I am going to participate in the debate like an 
intellectual sharpshooter and later I will reformulate my written opinion'. It 
would be better. 
The most clearly contrary opinion arguing that the judgement session is not 
a deliberation session was that of Justice C: 
I don't think so. It is a session for the presentation of points of view that are 
either already defined or that are reinforced during the discussion but are not 
brought about by it. The discussion itself is only an opportunity for the 
affirmation of points of view that are already in some way in the heads of the 
justices of the Supreme Court. The system does not frame this as a 
deliberative process, and it cannot be because to do so, it would have to be 
another environment, an environment for discussion, not one for defending 
points of view. What would work would be this: 'look, I am thinking of this, 
                                                 
26 Justice G. 
27 Justice A. 
28 Justice E. 
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I am thinking out loud, but I want to listen, let's see, I am proposing this, 
what do you think? This or that could be considered...'. That is different, but 
the system does not foster it.29  
Finally, only one justice distinguished between the sessions of the panels and 
the plenary sessions in relation to the deliberative potential of both:  
In the panel, [there is] greater [possibility for debate], perhaps because it 
does not have the solemnity of the plenary session. I think that the panel has 
a more deliberative profile. In most cases, the plenary session is nothing 
more than the presentation of stagnant, individual opinions.30 
1. Order of the Reading of the Opinions 
The determination of who has the floor in a debate is rarely completely open. 
There must be some form of organization. As mentioned above, debate on 
the Brazilian Supreme Court is regulated by Articles 133 and 135 of the Court's 
rules of procedure. The former regulates the oral debate before the votes are 
taken; the latter defines how the voting is conducted. Since there are rarely 
oral debates before the voting, the only moment for deliberation is during the 
voting. The rules are quite rigid for this process: the Chief Justice will take 
the votes of the justice rapporteur and the other justices in the reverse order 
of seniority. 
As mentioned, this speaking order, which is always the same, does not appear 
to encourage debate.31 Even if there are other courts — especially in common 
law countries — that also use the criterion of reverse order of seniority, there 
are some peculiarities in the Brazilian court that make this fixed order 
                                                 
29 Justices R, P and S are also sceptical about the possibility of having deliberations in 
the judgement session. Justice R: 'It is rare, rare, it's rare [to have deliberation]'; 
Justice P: 'At times'; Justice S: 'It is more for [reaching] a decision than for 
deliberating'. 
30 Justice D. For a comparison of the level of cohesion in the panels and the plenary 
session, see Evan Rosevear, Ivar A. Hartmann, and Diego Werneck Arguelhes, 
'Disagreement on the Brazilian Supreme Court: An Exploratory Analysis' (31 
October 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629329, 18.  
31 Similarly, see Mendes (n 16) 167: 'As the interaction becomes more rigid and codified 
(like the ritual in which the order of individual votes follow a criterion of seniority), 
deliberation naturally loses spontaneity. And although deliberation cannot be seen as 
mere 'spontaneous conversation', hard rules of interaction may turn it artificial'. 
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potentially more problematic. In the supreme courts of both the US and the 
UK, the reverse order of seniority is used in a preliminary meeting at which 
the justices give their views on the case being decided. After the preliminary 
meeting, the opinion of the Court and, if any, the concurring or dissenting 
opinions (in the US court) or the draft opinions of the individual justices (in 
the UK court) are shared with all the justices before the very final decision is 
taken. 
Nevertheless, some justices have no problem with the fixed order of opinion 
reading. Some simply stated: 'I do not see this as relevant',32 or 'I think that 
this [...] is not essential'33 without additional comment. Others argue that this 
rule is not important because it is not followed to the letter: 'This does not 
seem too important to me because it is not rigidly observed in reality'.34 
However, most of the justices believe that the rule is positive. There are a 
wide variety of reasons for this, some of which are conflicting. Some see the 
requirement that the newest members of the Court vote first as a form of 
protection. Within this form of protection, the idea of protecting justices 
from mutual influences appears. 
I think this is good. I think it is good because each one has their own moment 
to speak. And to begin with the freshman is good because—I was once a 
freshman — the freshman enters the Court with great respect for the senior 
[members] and can have a tendency to vote along with them; therefore, he 
should be the first to vote.35  
I think it is interesting because it allows the youngest to bring new ideas. For 
example, if he were shy, he would not feel at ease to dissent after the opinions 
of the more senior members, so it has this positive aspect.36 
I have never considered this issue. However, there is a reason for it. [It is] 
always the newest member [who presents his opinion first] so that he is not 
influenced by the more senior members. I think that this is an intelligent 
rule, a golden rule.37 
                                                 
32 Justice B. 
33 Justice T. 
34 Justice C. 
35 Justice O. 
36 Justice S. 
37 Justice I. 
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Other justices emphasize a positive effect on the more senior members rather 
than the newer ones: 
At first, I thought this was horrible. Then, I realized that the political 
advantage of this is the following: if there is disagreement, it is the more 
senior members who decide; it is a form of permanence to have the final 
opinions come from the most senior members who are the last ones to vote.38 
In contrast, Justice G argued that it is good because the younger justices can 
bring new ideas to the decisions:  
I confess that I never considered this. To begin with the newest [is] more 
thought-provoking; it brings new values, and the debate becomes richer.  
Those who are opposed to the model usually suggest the rule adopted in other 
Brazilian courts in which the order of speaking varies according to who the 
rapporteur is: 
I think it would be much more democratic if it varied according to the 
distribution of the case. It would be much more democratic and perhaps 
create greater security in voting by not always leaving the younger members 
to be cannon fodder.39  
Other courts follow the order of seniority after the rapporteur. It is the 
rapporteur and then goes by seniority. I think that this would be better 
because the criteria of the order would vary, but there would still be an 
order.40 
2. The Order of Reading and the Weight of the Justices 
In the already mentioned article, I argued that a fixed order of reading the 
written opinions could lead to a difference in the weight of each justice, 
especially for the most senior justices41 because the case may already be 
mathematically decided by the time it reaches the most senior associate 
justice in the voting process. As discussed above, there are several courts that 
adopt the same order (inverse seniority). Once more, the contrast with the 
US and UK supreme courts may be illustrative. The inverse seniority criteria 
                                                 
38 Justice R. 
39 Justice A. 
40 Justice D. 
41 See da Silva (n 2) 570–72.  
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are used in these courts in preliminary (and secret) sessions.42 In the Brazilian 
Supreme Court, after the most senior associate justice and the Chief Justice 
cast their votes — i.e., share their opinions for the first time with all other 
justices — the judgement session is finished.43 
Nevertheless, the justices have a quite a different perspective. Although they 
are aware that the risk exists of the most senior associate justice becoming of 
little relevance, almost all of them point to the fact that it is not the 
procedural rule that is relevant in these situations but the personality of the 
justices, especially the more senior associate justices and particularly the 
most senior. Thus, if there is a risk that the opinion of the most senior 
associate justice becomes of little relevance, it would be due to his lack of 
initiative, not a procedural rule.  
In the justices' responses, the most cited names were Justices Moreira Alves 
and Sepúlveda Pertence, as examples of the more active senior justices, who 
did not wait their turn to express their opinions — while the example of the 
most passive justice was always Justice Celso de Mello (the current most 
senior justice). In the following paragraphs, I transcribe these responses 
without additional commentary because they appear to me to be illustrative 
of the role that the personality of the most senior associate justice (or of the 
other rather senior justices) can have in the deliberation. 
This will depend on the style of each justice. For example, Marco Aurélio 
Mello makes use of a provision of the Court's rules of procedure that Moreira 
Alves and Pertence often used: 'I am not voting before my colleagues, but, 
given the written opinion of the rapporteur, I would like to debate'. Moreira 
Alves did this constantly. Marco Aurélio Mello did it quite a bit, but less 
often, and Pertence also did it a lot, a bit less than Moreira Alves. In contrast, 
                                                 
42 This may explain why there is almost no study addressing the issue at stake here, 
namely, the difference in the weight of each justice in the deliberation process. Leflar, 
however, argued that even in the preliminary conference, the order should not be 
fixed. See Robert A Leflar, 'The multi-judge decisional process' (1983) 42 Maryland 
Law Review 722, 726: '[t]he order in which judges state their views on cases during a 
conference has bearing on a judge's opportunity to influence the decision'. 
43 Even though any justice is allowed to change his or her mind before the judgment 
session is concluded, i.e., even after the most senior Associate Justice read his 
opinion, this rarely — if ever — occurs. 
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Celso de Mello, who [currently] is the most senior associate justice, does it 
much less.44  
The Court's rules of procedure allow each justice to intervene in the 
discussion, so Marco Aurélio Mello uses this a lot; he immediately asks to 
speak. In contrast, Justice Celso de Mello is more reserved; he winds up 
giving a lecture at the end of the session. He is the last to vote and has very 
little influence. He makes a speech that he thinks is for history books.45 
Moreira Alves would not let the chance go by: when he was the senior 
associate justice and in certain cases realized that the Court was leaning 
against his position, he would ask to speak and even ask to interrupt the 
session in order to view the case files.46 Not just anyone is able to fight in the 
plenary session because you will debate there with people with tremendous 
experience. At times I joked 'you have to hold the reins firmly or you may fall 
off the horse'.47  
He did not do this [speak before his turn]; Celso de Mello is much more 
evasive whenever possible.48  
Moreira Alves was like that; you began to vote and he would interrupt. He 
opened the debate at the beginning. Who had this personality? Moreira 
Alves, Pertence. Now, Celso de Mello does not. I think that he isn't even 
listening to what the others are saying.49 
Thus, because of this tendency to attribute the weight of each justice in the 
deliberation to personality issues rather than to procedural rules, there are 
few who believe that the voting order creates an imbalance in the debate. In 
addition to Justices A and D, who were mentioned in the previous section as 
                                                 
44 Justice F. 
45 Justice I. 
46 The possibility of interrupting the judgement session and requesting to view the case 
files ('pedir vista') is established by the Brazilian Civil Procedure Code (Article 555, § 
2): 'Every judge may interrupt a judgement session if he considers himself unable to 
reach a decision at the given moment'. These requests are sometimes also used to 
postpone the decision. 
47 Justice O. 
48 Justice Q. 
49 Justice R. 
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being opposed to the current fixed voting order, only retired Justice T 
mentioned some concern with a possible imbalance.50 
The fact that so many justices highlighted the personalities of their 
colleagues as pivotal, and provided clear examples thereof, should be taken 
into account. In light of this point, my original arguments, presented in the 
article mentioned above, should be refined to include the 'personality' 
variable. However, this does not mean that my arguments are rebutted.51 The 
fixed order still potentially decreases the influence of the most senior justices 
because they read their opinions last. The fact that some senior justices were 
and still are able to overcome the burden of 'jumping the queue' by expressing 
their points of view before their turn does not mean that the burden does not 
exist; it only means that the burden is not insurmountable. The case of Justice 
Celso de Mello, who has been the most senior associate justice on the 
Brazilian Supreme Court since 2007,52 clearly shows that not every senior 
associate justice is able or wants to be as active as they would need to be to 
have some degree of influence.  
3. How to Act When the Case Is Mathematically Resolved? 
Related to the previous issue, another question also arises addressing the 
strategy of how to proceed when a case is mathematically decided, i.e., when 
there are already six opinions in favour of a given position. In these moments, 
the influence of the justices who have still not voted is reduced given that it 
would be necessary for one of the justices who had already read their written 
opinion to change his or her position to alter the course of the judgement, 
which is not a simple task.  
One of the interview questions was raised precisely to determine how the 
justices act or would act in a plenary session in a situation such as this, i.e., if 
he had still not read his opinion, which is contrary to the already consolidated 
                                                 
50 Justice T: 'I think that a variation in the voting order would be very significant 
precisely for [avoiding differences in the weight of the vote between the justices who 
vote earlier and those who vote later]'.  
51 I would like to thank Diego Werneck Arguelhes for pointing this out to me. 
52 The justices mentioned above as having more active personalities, Moreira Alves and 
Sepúlveda Pertence, were the most senior associate justices from 1986 to 2003 and 
from 2003 to 2007, respectively. 
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majority. In this situation, the basic options would be (i) to simply read the 
written opinion as it was written, (ii) to reconsider the written opinion 
(during the plenary session or after requesting time view the case files) to try 
to counter the arguments of the majority, (iii) to try to join the majority but 
offer some different arguments that could perhaps be accepted; or (iv) to 
simply join the majority. 
Most of the justices argued that their response would depend on the case 
being decided. Many of them said that all the strategies are possible: 'you 
could take any one of these four strategies, any one'.53 Justices E and R had 
similar responses: 
All the responses would be possible depending on the case, but I would say 
that if it is an issue that I consider to be important, and the Court is heading 
in a direction diametrically opposed to that which I believe correct, I would 
ask to be allowed to intervene before my turn and present my argument, even 
if only briefly. If I find that my argument would not be wholly accepted, I 
would try my second best option, which would be to try to neutralize the 
extreme that seemed to me to be unfavourable. And, in certain cases, if I 
believe the issue unimportant and the majority was already determined, I 
may just let it go.54  
There is no rule. For example, if I understand that the consequences of a 
given decision would be disastrous, I would ask for time to view the case files; 
if I think that the consequences of the decision would not be disastrous but 
nevertheless have a dissenting argument, I would maintain my position, but 
not read the written opinion to avoid disturbing the others. [I would say] 'I 
dissent in the terms of the written opinion, which I will file later...' since I 
knew that I would not change the opinions of the other justices. If I had a 
point of view that could be accepted by the majority, I would [present it].55 
                                                 
53 Justice H. This justice added a fifth strategy, which was analysed in the previous 
section: 'There is still a fifth [option]. You can say the following; 'look, the opinion of 
the rapporteur appears to me to be incorrect, and I would like to anticipate my 
opinion' to try to influence, in the best sense, the other justices who will vote 
afterwards. I will not let it reach me with the fact consummated; I will anticipate my 
dissent right away'. 
54 Justice E. 
55 Justice R. 
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Here the variable 'workload' was also mentioned as a factor that could 
influence the behaviour of the justices. In this sense, Justice Q stated:  
The tendency is towards the latter [to simply join the majority]. In second 
place, the next to last [try to join the majority but offer some different 
arguments that could perhaps be accepted]. And this has a lot to do with the 
workload. 
However, there are justices who emphasize that it is not possible to 
compromise, especially when handling the most important cases. For 
example, Justice B argued: 
I never thought of joining the majority, no. If I had a differing position, I 
wouldn't do that. I think that I would have to maintain the dissenting 
position depending on the importance of the issue. 
The position of Justice G is a bit more incisive, but takes a similar direction: 
'No, I think that in the most polemical cases, I would offer my own 
contribution as I would have taken it to the judgement session'. 
The position of Justice F was different from all the others. He stated that the 
justices simply cannot vote in another way that is not faithful to their 
conviction with the exception of the Chief Justice:  
The ten associate justices of the Brazilian Supreme Court have the sole and 
exclusive commitment to vote along with their own conviction and must 
vote as such. The possibility of a Supreme Court justice voting against his 
conviction is exclusive to the Chief Justice. The associate justices on the 
Supreme Court do not have the right to do this and cannot do this without 
running the risk of subverting their consciences. 
This point of view is especially opposed to that expressed by Justice E, who 
explicitly mentioned the possibility of voting according to a second 
preference to try to neutralize the extreme that would appear unfavourable. 
It seems that Justice F would understand this strategic behaviour as a 
'subversion of the conscience' of the judge.  
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4. Interaction with Lawyers  
In many constitutional and supreme courts, during the oral arguments 
justices may ask questions to the lawyers.56 Although this moment precedes 
the deliberation itself,57 it can have an important effect on the debate among 
the justices. 
In the Brazilian Supreme Court, this practice does not exist. At most, the 
justices may ask questions to clarify a factual issue. When questioned about 
the importance of debate with lawyers, several justices emphasized the value 
of the oral arguments58 and many stated that they favour the possibility of 
debating with the lawyers. Nevertheless, many justices pointed to a certain 
lack of experience among many of the attorneys who present oral arguments 
at the Supreme Court.  
Among those favourable to greater interaction between justices and 
attorneys, some mentioned that it should not simply follow the current 
model. Some changes were suggested:  
I think that this interaction should take place. And certain formalities that 
create a distance between the judge and the lawyer should be eliminated.59 
Maybe the most important change would be the realization of oral arguments 
(with or without debate) in a distinct (previous) session, as usually occurs in 
other constitutional courts and supreme courts: 
I think that the oral argument as it is conducted in Brazil has limited value 
because it is a very unilateral process. The rapporteur generally already has 
his opinion written, which means that for him, the oral arguments rarely have 
any consequence. I would favour a model in which the oral debate were made 
in a session prior to the judgement session.60  
                                                 
56 'Advocate', 'lawyer' and 'attorney' are terms used here in the broad sense to 
encompass all those who present oral arguments in the plenary session of the 
Supreme Court. 
57 See Mendes (n 15) 162.  
58 Justice F: 'My experience shows that the oral arguments can lead to a change in the 
outcome of the judgement'. 
59 Justice G. 
60 Justice E. 
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Although favouring a debate between justices and attorneys, Justice B 
mentions that with the Supreme Court's current workload, this interaction 
would not be possible or even productive: 
An oral argument in the plenary session, for example, may have a very strong 
influence — not necessarily on the rapporteur, but on those who still have to 
vote — and in some cases certainly influence the opinions of the other 
justices. But the workload is a pivotal issue here. [A debate with the 
attorneys] would perhaps require having only that judgement [on that day].61 
And the presentation of oral arguments could not be limited to fifteen 
minutes [as it is today]. The system would have to be completely remodelled. 
Finally, although several justices might be favourable to having greater 
interaction with attorneys, they point to a certain lack of experience of those 
who make oral arguments in the Supreme Court, which can undermine the 
potential of this interaction: 
On one occasion, I began to ask the attorney a few questions, but I forgot 
that he was quite young, and he became embarrassed, so a colleague nudged 
me — 'why are you causing trouble?' I apologized, [and said] 'No further 
questions'. So there is this issue as well. Since it is not usual [to ask questions], 
the attorney can understand that this is being done as a form of pressure.62 
Justices C and I were more explicit about the lack of experience of the 
attorneys: 
What happens here in the Supreme Court? The person who comes to argue 
here at times is quite young and does not even fully understand the case, so it 
is impossible to engage in a dialogue. This can be detrimental. I think it is not 
very productive.63  
The attorneys are extremely unprepared! What is happening today? The 
person graduates, [...] takes the bar exam, and the next day is presenting oral 
arguments before the Supreme Court. One day, during a break in the session, 
a young man, who was young enough to be my son, and a young woman came 
to me. She sat here and he sat there. He [...] looked at me and asked: 'did you 
receive my brief?'. I looked at him and said: 'young man, look, according to 
the Court's rules of procedure, you should call me Your Honour, but you can 
                                                 
61 Unlike what occurs in many courts, in the Brazilian Supreme Court, many cases are 
often judged in a single day (or, to be more precise, in a single afternoon).  
62 Justice O. 
63 Justice C. 
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call me Sir and start over'... [In other countries,] there is a long way before 
being admitted to the Supreme Court's bar. This rule would facilitate a 
better dialogue because it would be a dialogue among equals. But [here], you 
are clearly not dialoguing among equals.64 
V. CONSENSUS SEEKING 
On the Brazilian Supreme Court, as on almost all similar courts around the 
world, the decisions are made by the majority. That is, six votes are enough 
for a case to be decided in a certain direction. Even so, there are studies that 
indicate that some courts make an effort to decide cases by broader 
majorities or even by consensus.65 
Questioned about a similar tendency on the Brazilian Supreme Court, only 
one of the incumbent justices and two of the retired justices were able to 
identify a consensus-seeking tendency. Justice G stated: 
There is an effort in this direction because, one way or another, the justices, 
when they eventually meet outside the sessions, debate. During the interval 
of a session, they debate the issues. Thus today, there is an effort to reach an 
institutional decision.66 
No other justice expressed a similar perception.67 In fact, some believed that 
this effort to reach a consensus should not even exist:  
If I could give weight to a unanimous decision and to a majority decision, I 
would give a higher weight to a majority decision because it is the 
unequivocal understanding that the issue was discussed. In the plenary 
session, I very much resent the fact that at times, for one reason or another, 
an issue is decided without greater discussion.68 
Although they understand that this search for consensus should exist, others 
do not see an environment that is propitious to this on the Brazilian Supreme 
Court: 
                                                 
64 Justice I. 
65 See Kranenpohl, Hinter dem Schleier des Beratungsgeheimnisses (n 3) 181. 
66 Justice G. 
67 Justice B: 'No, I do not believe that this exists, I don't see it '; Justice D: 'No, it doesn't 
exist, it doesn't exist'. 
68 Justice A. 
232 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol 9 No.2 
There is none. It's each one for himself and God for all. As soon as I entered 
in the Court, I asked, '[Justice] Jobim, listen, don't you discuss things here?'; 
[he answered] 'Ah, no, I tried to have discussions, but it didn't work'. [...] I 
think that [...] when you have a score higher than this minimum of six to five, 
the legitimacy of the decision is more robust. You will always have a justice 
like Marco Aurélio Mello, who will always dissent, but even this is good. [For 
example], the decision on same-sex civil union: I strongly insisted that we 
discuss this issue beforehand so that we could establish some premises and 
reject others to avoid each justice making his own speech. That is not good.69 
An attempt to explain the absence of a consensus-seeking orientation was 
given by Justice F, who attributed this role to the Chief Justice and to the 
rapporteur of each case. When the Chief Justice or the rapporteur do not 
take on consensus (or broad majorities) as a goal, it is very difficult for this to 
occur naturally. His explanation deserves a longer transcription: 
This is the role of the Chief Justice; it is the role of the rapporteur, who has 
to take the initiative. The other associate justices here are quite passive. You 
can ask 'should it be like this?' My answer is no. And you ask, 'So, why is it 
like this? Is there an explanation?' There is. The number of cases that we have 
to decide is so cumbersome that we think, 'ah, I am not the rapporteur of the 
case, I am not the chief of the panel, I am not the Chief Justice, I vote how I 
want to vote; here is my vote, it's done. Why would I have to try to find a 
compromise solution?'. This is the role of the rapporteur, of the justice who 
first dissented, or of the Chief Justice. 
Following this idea that it is up to the Chief Justice (or to the rapporteur) to 
try to foster consensus or broader majorities, Justice I mentioned that he 
acted this way when he was on the Electoral Court: 
We have to sit down together, and it's easy: 'look, people, let's have coffee 
and do this and that; let's establish some shared premises and let's go into the 
session in agreement'. I have done this. One day I had a big problem [on the 
Electoral Court]. There was a delay, a justice was absent, and in the other 
room I had a good bottle of whiskey. I sent the waiter to bring some cheese 
and served a few glasses of whiskey to my colleagues and [said] 'take a look at 
this here' and we began to talk and we went to the session... An informal 
conversation can work miracles. There is no demerit in this at all. Because 
this is not academia, do you agree? We are one of the political branches, 
                                                 
69 Justice I. 
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which must take decisions. And the more consistent, coherent, firm, and 
univocal the decisions, the better for the country, the better for the citizens. 
However, the absence of a search for consensus does not appear to be peculiar 
to the most recent benches of the Court. The large majority of the retired 
justices stated that they also did not see a trend towards consensus.70 In fact, 
in the case of retired justices, almost none appeared to see a problem in 
lacking a consensus-seeking orientation.71 To the contrary, it is identified as 
an attitude that demonstrates respect for individual positions:72 
No, no, this doesn't exist. On the Supreme Court, the individual's point of 
view is strongly respected.73  
Never, never. And in fact, there were many decisions made by tight 
majorities [...] this is inevitable, there is not a minimal chance on the 
Supreme Court, above all at a time like this, to achieve anything different, 
[such as] 'let's try to make a bit stronger majority'. This possibility does not 
exist. 74  
No, no one was ever concerned with this. [Because a search for consensus] 
would imply coercing people to adopt a line of thinking when in reality, they 
are not prone to this.75 
These answers — especially the latter — seem to perfectly express the fear 
that consensus-oriented deliberation could suggest: 'that a justice is open to 
                                                 
70 Only Justice R stated that 'There was [a tendency to seek consensus]. Then it 
disappeared. But at first, it was there, there was an effort. [...] When things got very 
complicated [...] one would ask to view the case file in order to try to reach consensus 
later. At times, the request to view the files was merely instrumental only to try later 
to discuss the issue over a coffee'. 
71 With the exception of Justice T: 'I would even like if it were like that, but I knew it 
wouldn't be because unity never prevailed'. 
72 The answers of the justices of the Brazilian Supreme Court in this regard are very 
similar to the most current justification of British judges for maintaining the seriatim 
system: (Andrew Le Sueur, 'A Report on Six Seminars About the UK Supreme Court' 
(2008) 1 Queen Mary University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research 
Paper, 32). 
73 Justice O. 
74 Justice Q. 
75 Justice N. 
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compromise her own view of the underlying legal merits of an appeal in order 
to achieve some extraneous, distinctly non-legal or policy goal'.76 
However, some retired justices did mention that even without a general trend 
towards consensus-oriented interactions, the older benches of the Court 
sometimes identified cases that deserved special attention and that, if 
possible, should be decided by a broader majority or by consensus. In these 
situations, a 'session of the council' or even an 'administrative session', both 
held behind closed doors, could be used for a preliminary debate:77 
You had cases in which it was convenient for a decision to be taken by a truly 
substantial majority. These were cases for a session of the council. Precisely 
to know the different points of view, to not have a decision with too much 
dissent and to not have unnecessary debates during the session. The Supreme 
Court was very careful about this issue.78  
At the time when there were administrative sessions, these issues were 
discussed. 'Should this decision be unanimous?', 'Even if there are dissenting 
opinions, should it appear unanimous?'. And this was a political decision that 
was related to some high public interest of the country.79 
However, these 'sessions of the council' have been virtually discontinued. 
One of the justices explained the decline in the importance of the sessions of 
the council as follows: 
It was pretty much dissolved as Justice Marco Aurélio Mello joined the 
Court. He was adamantly against this preliminary conversation. [...] 
                                                 
76 Benjamin Alarie and Andrew Green, 'Should They All Just Get Along? - Judicial 
Ideology, Collegiality, and the Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada' 
(2008) 58 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 73, 82. 
77 Article 151 of court's rules of procedure establishes that secret sessions might take 
place: (I) when one of the justices provides relevant reasons for it or (II) by request of 
the Chief Justice to discuss administrative matters. The first are sessions of the 
council and the latter are the so-called 'administrative sessions'. The sole paragraph 
of Article 152 explicitly provides that in the first case, the judgement session that 
follows the session of the council must be public. 
78 Justice O. 
79 Justice S. 
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Sometimes he didn't show up or showed up to protest, etc. Since then, the 
meetings have very rarely been held.80 
VI. COLLEGIALITY 
The Brazilian Supreme Court is a collegial body. This does not mean that 
there is collegiality on the Court. The definition of collegiality that was 
presented for the justices was quite broad. It should be understood not in the 
sense that there necessarily be friendship or that dissent among the justices 
should be always avoided, but in the sense that there be a willingness to work 
as a team, to listen to the arguments of colleagues and to be open to them, 
and when possible, to try to speak as a group and not as an individual. Given 
this definition, the questions presented to the justices were clear and direct: 
Is there (or, in the cases of the retired justices, was there) collegiality on the 
Supreme Court? 
1. Is There Collegiality on the Brazilian Supreme Court? 
The division between incumbent and retired justices was probably the 
clearest in this area. Practically all the incumbent justices stated that the 
environment was not at all collegial, while almost all of the retired justices, 
especially those who left the Court long ago, said that it was. And more than 
one justice mentioned the expression supposedly coined by Justice Sepúlveda 
Pertence, who once asserted that the Brazilian Supreme Court is composed 
of 11 islands: 
Collegiality is the ideal. It does not work like that, but it is the ideal. No, it 
does not exist here. There is even a saying that you can put in quotes: 
Sepúlveda Pertence said that the Supreme Court is constituted of 'eleven 
islands'! He always said this, and I think this is very true. After a few years, I 
said to him one day 'and they don't even form an archipelago'.81  
                                                 
80 Justice P. The administrative sessions still take place several times a year. However, 
in these sessions, the justices do not discuss cases that are pending in the Court; they 
only address administrative matters. In some exceptional cases, the administrative 
sessions may still be used to define some procedural details of the decision-making 
process of pending cases, but never the merits of a case. 
81 Justice C. On the 11 island metaphor, see, for instance, Guilherme Forma Klafke and 
Bruna Romano Pretzel, 'Processo Decisório no Supremo Tribunal Federal: 
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Look, it doesn't exist [collegiality]. There are eleven islands, and it absolutely 
does not exist. At times you may try to convince a certain group so that you 
have a pre-majority, so that your position will prevail. But collegiality does 
not exist on the Supreme Court. And it will take a long time to achieve it!82 
Among the incumbent justices, only Justice G adamantly declared that 'there 
is an environment of collegiality'. All the others clearly said there was not, or 
mentioned conditional factors, which were often not satisfied, for this 
collegial environment to be attained. Moreover, although many linked the 
lack of collegiality to the current deliberative model, the perception that 
there is no collegiality is not directly related to their opinion of about this 
model. In other words, even the justices who favour the current model, or are 
at least satisfied with it, still attribute the lack of collegiality to it, at least to 
some degree. 
I think that [collegiality has] great importance, although at least in the more 
complex cases, it is usually absent.83  
I think there is no collegiality. I think that this sense of collegiality does not 
exist. I think that the system does not favour it and there is resistance to it 
by some.84 
This 'resistance by some', mentioned by Justice D, can be deliberate 
resistance, i.e., a justice who believes that being open to being convinced by 
others or to trying to speak as a group and not as an individual is harmful to 
the work of the Court. But it can also be the result of personal difficulty, at 
least in the view of Justice F: 
It depends on each person's profile. We had here a fellow justice, and I 
admire him a lot, Eros Grau. [As] an only child, he had difficulty with this 
collegial body [...] I feel happy in the plenary session, I feel fortunate. I would 
be sad if I was alone. Thus, this is not only related to being a judge, but it also 
has to do with being human. 
                                                 
aprofundando o diagnóstico das onze ilhas' (2014) 1 Revista de Estudos Empíricos em 
Direito; Diana Kapiszewski, 'How Courts Work: Institutions, Culture, and the 
Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal' in Javier A Couso and others (eds), Cultures of 
Legality (Cambridge University Press 2010) 62. 
82 Justice I. 
83 Justice E. 
84 Justice D. 
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As mentioned above, the view of some of the retired justices is quite 
different, especially those who left the Court long ago.  
It did exist. It existed [a collegial environment]. [Justice] Brossard once 
wrote an article, and it was quite fortunate: he said that 'among the justices 
of the Supreme Court, there is a lot of cordiality, there is a lot of friendship, 
without any intimacy'. As an outside observer, I think that this has changed. 
I don't know if my observation is pertinent, but you see how the Barbosa 
Court was... This is one of the reasons that leads me to think that it's 
changed.85 
Not today. There is no doubt that there is none. Yes, there was more 
collegiality at that time.86  
When I entered the Court, there was an environment of collegiality. It was 
something curious because there were brutal debates, but they were debates 
about reasons, such as the debates between justices Néri da Silveira and 
Moreira Alves, Pertence and Velloso, and especially when Pertence and 
Moreira Alves got sharp. But no one left offended. In recent years, they 
began to strike at the person. That is not right. Instead of attacking the 
reasoning, one attacks the person. This began to create discord. And now 
there is hate there, and the environment is quite heavy. I was there recently, 
one speaks about another, complains, 'I was treated poorly, this way and 
that.87 
Retired justices certainly do not always see their time on the Court positively 
in relation to collegiality. Some of them also mentioned the argument of the 
eleven islands:  
Complete collegiality, no. I insist on the argument of the archipelago. Once 
in a while, let's say, some islands had a greater tendency to come together. 
But this was by chance.88 
                                                 
85 Justice O. The Barbosa Court [2012-2014] was marked by open conflicts and fights—
sometimes very harsh and impolite — between the Chief Justice Joaquim Barbosa and 
some of the associate justices, and sometimes between Barbosa and attorneys. Since 
the plenary sessions of the Brazilian Supreme Court are broadcast live on TV, these 
fights could also be followed live on TV. 
86 Justice Q. 
87 Justice R. 
88 Justice P. 
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However, when faced with the question of whether there had been some 
change in the environment of collegiality from their time to the present, all 
the retired justices stated that they identified a clear change, which always 
tended towards less collegiality.89 
2. Collegiality and Opening to the Arguments of Others  
Although nearly all the justices believe that there should be more collegiality 
on the Supreme Court, this opinion has not always been compatible with 
their own attitudes. As observed above, collegiality refers to the disposition 
to work as a team, to listen to the arguments of colleagues and be open to 
being convinced by them, and to try speaking as a group rather than as an 
individual whenever possible. Nevertheless, when asked about the frequency 
with which they were convinced by their colleagues, the responses indicated 
a lack of collegiality. There are those who said they never changed their 
position, those who asserted they had but not in important cases, and those 
who said that this happens frequently but were unable to give an example: 
Look, if you asked me to name a case, I can't remember precisely. But I have 
many times, many times [been convinced by a colleague's argument].90  
Yes, although it was a small change.91  
Sincerely, perhaps one time or another when there was a shift in the 
jurisprudence that I may not have known, but very rarely, very rarely.92 On 
the Supreme Court, never! On the truly polemical cases I have never voted 
without being sure which of the two points of view in confrontation was 
mine. So it was never necessary to change.93  
                                                 
89 For a different perception, see Kapiszewski (n 81) 63–65. It is important to bear in 
mind that the retired justices may unconsciously romanticize their time on the Court, 
especially those who left the Court long ago. Additionally, when someone is asked 
about his or her perception concerning events, persons and situations from the past, 
their memory is likely to be inaccurate or biased. For a good account of several 
cognitive biases (including confirmation bias, rewriting of memory and others), see 
Anthony G Greenwald, 'The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal 
history.' (1980) 35 American Psychologist 603.  
90 Justice H. 
91 Justice E. 
92 Justice I. 
93 Justice Q. 
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There was no case [in which it was necessary to change my opinion].94 
Only one justice declared a willingness to vote in line with the reasoning of 
his colleagues when they were better than his, offering examples and 
justifications: 
I had some cases, mainly in criminal issues. I was always more severe than my 
colleagues. But, at times, they advanced some arguments that I considered 
irrefutable. In such cases, I had no doubt. When I was not able to win over 
my conscience...95 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As stated at the beginning of this article, the justices of the Brazilian Supreme 
Court are, to a large degree, satisfied with its deliberative practices. In an 
exercise conducted at the end of the interviews called 'institutional creativity' 
in which each justice could define what, in his opinion, would be the best 
deliberative model for the Supreme Court,96 there were few variations in 
relation to the current model. In regard to deliberating in public, only 2 of the 
17 justices were opposed to the practice. Some retired justices defended the 
so-called 'sessions of the council', which were sessions prior to the judgement 
session — without public — to discuss procedural issues. However, even these 
justices are not opposed to the public plenary session.  
However, a very common practice, analysed throughout this article, appears 
to trigger a certain rejection among the justices: the custom of bringing 
written opinions, at times lengthy ones, to the deliberation and judgement 
sessions. Although virtually all justices follow this practice, which is not 
established by the Court's rules of procedure, all of them stated that if they 
could define the rules and practices of the Court on their own, they would 
prefer that only the justice rapporteur present his written opinion, which 
would be debated freely by the other justices. 
                                                 
94 Justice U. 
95 Justice S. 
96 In the definition of this 'ideal model', the justices were not bound by any 
constitutional, legal or regimental actual provision. In other words, they were at 
liberty to create the model they desired.  
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These two positions — to favour deliberating in public and to oppose taking 
written opinions to the deliberation session — may be considered 
compatible. Nevertheless, the practice of taking written opinions to the 
session has been consolidated precisely as the publicity of the deliberations 
increased, that is, when the plenary session came to be broadcast live on TV. 
In other words, according to this view, the justices only take written opinions 
(and at times lengthy ones) to the plenary session because a large public is 
watching. However, the justices do not appear to have identified this pattern. 
In any case, the division between retired and incumbent justices, which in 
part coincides with the division between justices with experience 
deliberating in front of the cameras (incumbent justices) and those without 
this experience (retired justices), appears to point to an important change 
associated with the deliberative practice in the Brazilian Supreme Court. Not 
only are the deliberations in the most polemical cases rather a sequential and 
very formal reading of opinions, very far from an open debate; collegiality, 
essential to sincere deliberation, also appears to have drastically decreased in 
recent years. 
